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Abstract: The Europeanisation of domestic law calls for a classical methodology
to ‘update’ the established traditions of the law. The relationship between Euro-
pean directives and national law is difficult, since directives do apply, but Euro-
pean legal texts need to be implemented into national law. Whilst directives are
not binding on private individuals, there is no direct third-party effect, but only an
‘indirect effect’. This effect is influenced by the stipulations of the ECJ, but is ulti-
mately determined in accordance with methodical principles of national law. The
ECJ uses a broad term of interpretation of the law. In contrast, in German and
Austrian legal methodology the wording of a provision defines the dividing line
between interpretation and further development of the law. The article reveals
how legal scholars and the case-law have gradually shown in recent decades a
greater willingness to shift from a narrow, traditional boundary of permissible
development of the law to a modern line of case-law regarding the boundary of
directive-compliant, permissible development of the law.
Résumé: En rapport avec la européansiation du droit national une réforme des
méthodes classiques de la juridiction de chaque État Membre est nécessaire. Cela
est valable pour la relation entre les directives européens et le droit national en
particulier, parce que les directives s’appliquent immédiatement mais ont besoin
d’être transférés au droit national. Parce que les directives ne sont pas applicables
entre les personnes privées sans acte de transformation, l’exégèse du droit na-
tional doit être fait en conformité avec le droit européen. La Cour de Justice de
l’union européenne (CJUE) a développée des principes généraux, mais l’applica-
tion dans les cas concrètes et les détails sont déterminées par les cours et tribu-
naux nationaux. Le CJUE applique le terme de conformité au droit européen très
extensivement. La méthodologie juridique allemande et autrichien différencie en-
tre interprétation en conformité et l’extension de la loi en prenant les mots comme
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limite de l’interprétation. L’article décrit le développement de la juridiction et de
la littérature juridique envers une compréhension de l’interprétation conforme au
droit européen de plus en plus moderne en survenant les idées traditionnelles.
Cette contribution essaie de faire comprendre les arguments différents, qui for-
ment la base de cette développement.
Zusammenfassung: Im Zuge der Europäisierung nationalen Rechts ist auch eine
Aktualisierung der klassischen Methodenlehre des jeweiligen Mitgliedstaates er-
forderlich. Dies gilt im Besonderen für das schwierige Verhältnis von EU-Richtli-
nien und dem nationalen Recht, weil Richtlinien zwar unmittelbar gelten, aber in
das nationale Recht umgesetzt werden müssen. Da Richtlinien nicht unmittelbar
horizontal zwischen privaten Personen Anwendung finden, muss nationales
Recht richtlinienkonform angewendet werden. Diese richtlinienkonforme Anwen-
dung des nationalen Rechts wurde zwar vom EuGH entwickelt; die Einzelheiten
bestimmten sich aber nach nationalem Recht. Der EuGH verwendet einen weiten
Begriff der europarechtskonformen Auslegung des Rechts. Die deutsche und ös-
terreichische juristische Methodenlehre nutzt hingegen die Wortlautgrenze zur
Unterscheidung von Auslegung und wortlautüberschreitender Rechtsfortbildung.
Der folgende Beitrag beschreibt, wie Rechtsprechung und Rechtsliteratur in im-
mer stärkerem Maße bereit sind, von einem engen, traditionellen Verständnis ei-
ner richtlinienkonformen Auslegung zu einem modernen, weiten Verständnis ei-
ner richtlinienkonformen Auslegung zu gelangen. Dieser Beitrag versucht die
verschiedenen Argumentationsfiguren nachzuvollziehen, die dieser Entwicklung
zugrunde liegen.
I Introduction: no Horizontal Direct Effect, versus
the Principle of Indirect Effect
1 Effectiveness of EU Law – the Direct Effect of EU Law
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) actively uses case-law to promote
the notion of creating an ever closer Union.1 In a chain of rulings, the ECJ has
established uncodified principles with the aim of rendering EU law forceful and
1 G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012) 22, 86.
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effective. The EU Treaties therefore rank higher than the laws of the Member
States, and under certain circumstances can have a direct effect in these States
(the principle of direct effect).2 The principle of vertical direct effect applies to
regulations and directives,3 but the ECJ has denied that there is a direct effect of
directives between private parties – the ‘horizontal effect’. The wording of Arti-
cle 288(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contra-
dicts such a development of the law in favour of the recognition of a horizontal
direct effect, since only the Member State, but not the citizen, is obliged to imple-
ment the directive. This supposed gap in horizontal third-party effect is, however,
limited, given that the ECJ has extended vertical third-party effects to include a
broad concept of the ‘Member State’4 which obliges national courts to interpret
the law in a directive-compliant manner, and may threaten to impose state liabi-
lity under EU law for any Member State that does not implement it (correctly).5
This article analyses in detail the implementation of the principle of indirect effect
in Germany and Austria. It will show that German case-law and legal literature are
shifting the contra legem boundary, and will highlight parallel legal develop-
ments in Germany and Austria.6
2 The Principle of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law
After the ECJ had negated the horizontal direct effect of directives, it developed
an obligation to interpret national law in a directive-compliant manner according
to the requirements of such directives. The reference material that exists in Eng-
lish uses different terms to define what in German is referred to as ‘richtlinienkon-
forme Auslegung’. The terms commonly used are ‘principle of indirect effect’,7
2 Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (26/62) EU:C:1963:1 at [ 7],
[25]–[26]; in detail, L. Woods, P. Watson and M. Costa, Steiner & Woods EU Law (13th ed, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017) 114–118.
3 Van Duyn v Home Office (C-41/74) EU:C:1974:133 at [12]; Public Prosecutor v Ratti (C-148/78) EU:
C:1979:110 at [21];Ursula Becker v FinanzamtMünster-Innenstadt (C-8/81) EU:C:1982:7.
4 Marshall I v Southhampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (C-152/84) EU:
C:1986:84 at [48]–[56].
5 Francovich v Italian Republic (C-6/90 et al) EU:C:1991:428 at [32]–[37].
6 The article is based in parts on a talk which was given at the conference Richterliche Rechtsfort-
bildung und ihre Grenzen (Judicial further development of the law and its boundaries) held at the
Austrian Supreme Court in Vienna on 28 May 2018.
7 P. CraigandG.deBúrca,EULaw (6th ed,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 2015) 209–216;Woods,
Watson and Costa, n 2 above, 137–144.
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‘principle of harmonious interpretation’8 or ‘principle of consistent interpreta-
tion’.9 ‘Directive-compliant interpretation’ seems to be the best term because it is
close to the definition used by the ECJ. It requires national law to be interpreted
in such a way as to achieve the objectives set out in directives. This obligation
covers all national law, not just the law implementing the particular directive.10
The ECJ stated the requirement as follows in the Adelener case:
‘It should be noted that the obligation on the national court to refer to the content of a frame-
work decision when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law is limited by general
principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that a prin-
ciple cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, by
analogy, Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I‑5285, para 44 and 47).
Nevertheless, the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with Commu-
nity law [better: interpreted in a directive-compliant manner]11 requires national courts to do
whatever lies within their jurisdiction. They must take the whole body of domestic law into
consideration and apply the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view
to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consis-
tent with the objective pursued by it (see Pfeiffer and Others, para 115, 116, 118 and 119).’12
Even though the Court denies that directives exert a horizontal effect, a directive-
compliant interpretation of provisions that apply between private individuals
does not develop the strict primacy of application that primary law or EU regula-
tions can create.13 The obligation to interpret the directive narrowly already fol-
lows from the direct applicability of a directive. According to Article 288(3) TFEU,
directives are binding upon each Member State.14 The obligation to interpret do-
mestic law in a directive-compliant manner is an objective legal requirement ad-
dressed to all public authorities in the Member State. The primary objective of the
interpretation is to bring national law in line with higher-ranking EU law.
8 Craig and de Búrca, n 7 above, 209–216.
9 Woods,WatsonandCosta,n 2above, 137;G. Betlem, ‘TheDoctrineofConsistent Interpretation–
Managing Legal Uncertainty’ (2002) 22Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 397.
10 Marleasing SA v La Comerical Internacional de Alimentaction SA (C-106/89) EU:C:1990:395 at
[8]; see Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl (C-91/92) EU:C:1994:292 at [26].
11 Added by the author.
12 Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [110]–[111].
13 W.H. Roth, ʻDie richtlinienkonforme Auslegungʼ (2005) Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
recht 385, 386.
14 Inter-EnvironnementWallonie v RégionWallonnie (C-129/96) EU:C:1997:628 at [41].
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3 Considerable Legal Uncertainty – how to ascertain the Limits
of the ‘Contra Legem’ Concept?
Strictly speaking, the ECJ is only permitted to interpret EU law, but not national
law.15 This has not however deterred the Court from stressing the obligation to
interpret in a directive-compliant manner in many of its rulings, or from explain-
ing the national legislature’s intentions, as well as the systematics and the telos of
the interpretation.16 This leads to considerable uncertainty as to when and where
the contra legem limit lies.17 There has been controversial debate for years in Ger-
many and Austria as to whether the obligation of directive-compliant interpreta-
tion also encompasses an obligation to reach an outcome that is aligned with
European law, even if it goes against the wording of national law. There is now
an ever growing tendency to acknowledge such a right to further development of
the law, over and above the national wording of the law. Courts have the right to
develop the law, but must not rule contra legem. It might therefore be worth con-
sidering whether a further principle should be introduced into the English usage,
namely directive-compliant development of the law.18
II The Relevance, Definition and General
Permissibility of Directive Compliant
Development of the Law
1 The Scope of Directive-Compliant ‘Interpretation’ as a
perennial Issue of Methodology
Legal methodology is a theory of legitimacy and legal reasoning. By applying
figures of argumentation,19 legal methodology seeks to render legal decisions
15 Cf art 19 para 1 sentence 2 TEU: ‘It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties the law is observed.’
16 Cf n 10, 12 and n 23.
17 Craig and de Búrca, n 7 above, 216: ‘It would be very difficult to predict the outcome of any
litigation, since the duty of harmonious interpretation demands that national courts consider all
national law indecidingwhether compatibilitywith theprovisions of thedirective canbeattained.’
18 Distinguishing between interpretation of the law on the one hand and development of the law
on the other seems more precise than the current English terminology simply referring to ‘indirect
effect’ (cf n 7–9).
19 On the term ʻfigure of argumentationʼ see T. M. J. Möllers, Legal Methods (Oxford: C H Beck –
Hart –Nomos, 2020) sec 1 para 67–92.
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rationally verifiable.20 Courts have shown an astonishing level of flexibility in the
past 30 years when it comes to applying the law in order to facilitate directive-
compliant further development of the law, even where the wording did not com-
ply with the national provision. Three German court rulings demonstrate this
development. The first example is nearly thirty years old. The methodological
assessment of the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) in the Harz
judgment paved the way for the EU Anti-discrimination Directive to be applied in
Germany in 1989. The Directive provided that job applicants who had been the
victims of discrimination should be granted access to the courts.21 In the original
version of section 611 a of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB),
the German legislature had only granted job applicants the reimbursement of job
application expenses.22 The ECJ considered this to be insufficient, since it was
not very effective and did not have a deterrent effect in terms of protecting job
applicants from discrimination.23 The Federal Labour Court went on to examine
section 823 subsection 1 of the Civil Code as a ‘small blanket clause of tort law’.
The Court created a new right; it found gender discrimination against job appli-
cants to constitute a violation of the right of personality, and awarded damages
to the claimant.24 This judgment has been heavily criticised because it circum-
vented the wording of section 611 a of the Civil Code, and was said not to be
aligned with the previous group of cases regarding serious violations of the right
of personality.25
Thirty years have now passed, and other cases have addressed the directive-
compliant development of the law expressis verbis. The issue in the Quelle deci-
20 Möllers, n 19 above, sec 1 para 92.
21 Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 14 March 1989, 8 AZR 447/87, BAGE 61, 209 at 214 et seq –
Harz; also see art 6, 7 of the Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and
promotion, andworking conditions (1976)OJEC L 39/40.
22 Federal Law Gazette (BGBl) 1980 I, 1308.
23 Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH (C-79/83) EU:C:1984:155 at [21]–[28]. Handed down on the
same day: Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (C-4/83) EU:
C:1984:153 at [21]–[28].
24 Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 14 March 1989, 8 AZR 447/87, BAGE 61, 209 and 215–216 –
Harz.
25 S. Wiese, ʻVerbot der Benachteiligung wegen des Geschlechts bei der Begründung eines Ar-
beitsverhältnissesʼ (1990) Juristische Schulung 357, 362; C.-W. Canaris, ʻDie richtlinienkonforme
Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung im System der juristischen Methodenlehreʼ, in H. Koziol and
P. Rummel (eds), Im Dienste der Gerechtigkeit, Festschrift für Franz Bydlinski (Vienna: Springer,
2002) 97–98.
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sion was whether a customer had to pay compensation for use when returning a
defective good after a certain time. The unambiguous wording of section 439
subsection 4 of the Civil Code had for decades provided compensation for the
use of a defective good. The ECJ however denied the seller’s claim against the
consumer for compensation for use because the warranty claims under Article 3
of the Consumer Sales Directive were to be ‘free of charge’.26 The Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) reversed its former ruling. For the first time, it
explicitly adopted the legal concept of directive-compliant development of the
law, which had been created by scholars as early as in the 1990 s.27 Contrary to
the wording of section 439 subsection 4 of the Civil Code (old version), it af-
firmed a teleological reduction28 of this section to eliminate the claim for com-
pensation for use in B2C relationships which had previously been recognised in
Germany.29 This approach was heavily criticised in the literature. As Lorenz
wrote: ‘All interpretative criteria of German law, including the express intention
of the German legislature, argued for a corresponding obligation incumbent on
the consumer.’30
In the Tiles case, the claimant purchased defective tiles and installed them in
his house. After recognising the defect, the customer demanded the delivery of
non-defective tiles and payment for the cost of removing the old tiles and instal-
ling new ones amounting to € 5,830. Such claims had been rejected in the past,31
or only affirmed if the seller had been responsible for the breach of duty.32 The ECJ
26 QuelleAGvBundesverbandderVerbraucherzentralenundVerbraucherverbände (C-404/06)EU:
C:2008:231 at [31]–[43].
27 S. Grundmann, ʻRichtlinienkonforme Auslegung im Bereich des Privatrechts – insbesondere:
der Kanon der nationalen Auslegungsmethoden als Grenze?ʼ (1996) Zeitschrift für Europäisches
Privatrecht 399 and 420; T. M. J. Möllers, ʻDoppelte Rechtsfortbildung contra legem?ʼ (1998) Euro-
parecht 20 and45; T. M. J. Möllers,TheRole of Law in European Integration (NewYork:Nova Science
Publisher, 2003) 80.
28 By definition a teleological reduction restricts the wording so that the purpose of the norm fits
teleologically, cf Möllers, n 19 above, sec 6 para 82–96.
29 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 26 November 2008, VIII ZR 200/05, BGHZ 179, 27 at [26] –
Quelle.
30 S. Lorenz, in F. J. Säcker et al (eds),MünchenerKommentar zumBürgerlichenGesetzbuch (7th ed,
Munich: C H Beck, 2016) before sec 474 subsec 3 [translated from the original German].
31 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 15 July 2008, VIII ZR 211/07, Neue Juristische Wochens-
chrift 2008, 2837 at [23]–[27] – refusing to meet the cost of installation in accordance with sec 439
subsec 2 of the German Civil Code.
32 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 2 April 2014, VIII ZR 46/13,Neue JuristischeWochenschrift
2014, 2183 at [23]–[28]–no installation costs between companies. The legal situation inAustriawas
the same, cf B. Zöchling-Jud, ʻDer Einfluss des Europarechts auf das Privatrechtʼ, in C. Fischer-
Czermak et al (eds), Festschrift 200 Jahre ABGB (vol 2, Vienna: MANZ, 2011) 1771.
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however found that the Consumer Sales Directive covers the seller’s obligation to
install and remove a defective good regardless of fault. The Court furthermore
found (more importantly for this Article) that the seller’s right to refuse subse-
quent delivery due to disproportionality in accordance with section 439 subsec-
tion 3, third sentence, of the Civil Code (old version) was in contravention of Arti-
cle 3 of the Consumer Sales Directive. The Directive states that a remedy (ie recti-
fication or supplementary supply) must be free of charge; however, the costs
could be restricted to a proportionate amount.33 To comply with the ECJ’s de-
mands, the Federal Court of Justice therefore had to develop the law in a direc-
tive-compliant manner, contrary to the wording of the national provision. It devel-
oped a teleological reduction of section 439 subsection 3 of the Civil Code for con-
sumer goods purchases, so that the disproportionate costs for the purchaser are
no longer sufficient to prevent the contract from being cancelled. The further de-
velopment of the law is said not to be permissible because the wording, history of
the law, system and telos clearly justified the refusal of subsequent performance
in the case of absolute disproportionality.34 There have been numerous other
judgments in Germany35 and Austria36 commenting on the boundaries of direc-
33 Gebr Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and Ingrid Putz vMedianess Electronics GmbH (C-65/09 et
al) EU:C:2011:396 at [62], [78].
34 D. Kaiser, ʻEuGH zumAustauschmangelhafter eingebauter Verbauchsgüterʼ (2011) Juristenzei-
tung 978, 986; S. Lorenz, ʻEin- und Ausbauverpflichtung des Verkäufers bei der kaufrechtlichen
Nacherfüllungʼ (2011) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2241, 2244; B. Gsell, ʻDie Reichweite der
Ersatzlieferungspflicht nach Einbau der mangelhaften Kaufsache durch den Verbraucherʼ (2012) 5
Zeitschrift für das Juristische Studium 369, 374.
35 For example, Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 24 March 2009, 9 AZR 983/07, BAGE 130
and 119 at [57]–[77] – Holiday pay; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 8 January 2014, V ZB
137/12, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2014, 1111 at [10]–[11]; Federal Court of Justice,
Judgment of 7 May 2014, IV ZR 76/11, BGHZ 201, 101 at [22]–[23] – Revocation of life insurance;
Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 28 October 2015, VIII ZR 158/11, BGHZ 207 and 209 at
[34]–[48] – Gas price adjustment clause; Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of 31 January
2017, 6 C 2.16, BVerwGE 157, 249 at [26]–[34] – Price adjustment, Telecommunications Act; Federal
Constitutional Court, Order of 26 September 2011, 2 BvR 2216/06 et al, Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift 2012, 669 at [51]–[66] – s 5 of the Doorstep Selling Cancellation Act (Haustürwiderrufsgesetz,
HWiG); Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 17 January 2013, 1 BvR 121/11 et al, ZIP 2013, 924 at
[33] – sec 264 subsec 3 of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB); Federal Constitutional
Court, Order of 17 November 2017, 2 BvR 1131/16, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-Rechtsprechungs-
Report 2018, 305 – Price adjustment, Telecommunications Act.
36 Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 31 August 2010, 4 Ob 120/10 at [1.1.] – Thermal
hotel L II; Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 15 February 2011, 4 Ob 208/10g at [3]. –
Bans on promotions; Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 19 March 2013, 4 Ob 15/13d at
[1.5.] – Clearance sale; Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 25 March 2014, 9 Ob 64/13x,
Österreichische Juristenzeitung 2014, 612 – Installation costs among companies.
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tive-compliant development of the law. The question of how far directive-compli-
ant development of the law can go, and when the contra legem limit is over-
stepped, is one of the most topical concerns of legal methodology in Germany and
Austria.
When looking at this matter, it is helpful to clarify what constitutes direc-
tive-compliant development of the law (II 2). Directive-compliant development
of the law facilitates a national as well as a European perspective. It is both
questionable and controversial whether a perspective that maintains the tradi-
tional status quo, or a more pro-European perspective, is preferable. The tradi-
tional point of view will be addressed first (III). However, it will be demonstrated
that significantly more arguments support the modern, European approach that
allows for more extensive directive-compliant development of the law, and leads
to a more appropriate justification of the contra legem limit (IV). I will discuss
below what advantages and disadvantages arise from a narrow versus a broad
definition of the scope of directive-compliant development of the law because
the contra legem limit is drawn either narrowly or widely, depending on the in-
dividual case.
2 The Definition of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law
(richtlinienkonforme Rechtsfortbildung)
In the past, a directive-compliant interpretation comprised development of the
law, and thus the term was broadly interpreted. Traditionally, the ECJ does not
respect a strict differentiation between the limit of the wording and judicial devel-
opment of the law.37 It understands the term ‘interpretation’ in a wide sense or
uses the French term interprétation, which in this respect recognises no sharp
separation between interpretation and further development of the law that goes
beyond the wording.38 Should German case-law now adopt this broad concept for
its own national methodology, and in the future only speak of interpretation or
application in the broader sense?
37 Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [110]–[111]. See Federal
Court of Justice, Judgment of 26 November 2008, VIII ZR 200/05, BGHZ 179, 27 at [21] – Quelle and
Möllers, n 19 above, sec 6 para 149.
38 W. Schroeder, ʻGrenzen der Rechtsprechungsbefugnis des EuGHʼ, in H. Altmeppen et al (eds),
Festschrift fürGünterH. Roth zum70. Geburtstag (Munich:C H Beck, 2011) 739; a strict separation is
also saidnot to bepossibleK.-D. Borchardt, ʻRichterrechtdurchdenEuGHʼ, inA. Randelzhofer et al
(eds),Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (Munich: C H Beck, 1995) 37.
The Principle of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law 473
In contrast, the terminological distinction between interpretation and devel-
opment of the law is widely recognised in Germany and Austria. Interpretation in
the narrow sense hovers at the very boundary of the meaning of the word, and devel-
opment of the law oversteps the literal sense of the law.39 This conceptual distinction
is reasonable, given that it increases the obligation to justify thedevelopment of the
law. The modern state under the rule of law has recognised the separation and the
interlinking of powers since Locke and Montesquieu.40 Legal methodology is now
constitutionally justified as a theory of legitimacy. A fundamental idea is therefore
the limitation of the power of the legal practitioner, and especially the judge. This
idea has two variants. First, it applies in the relationship between the judiciary and
the legislature. As amatter of principle, it is incumbent on Parliament to decide on
the material objective.41 Second, legal methodology binds the judge vis-à-vis the
citizen. Many examples favour distinguishing in methodical terms between ‘inter-
pretation’ and ‘further development of the law’. The principle of legality as an ex-
pression of the principle of the rule of law in criminal law requires that an act may
not be punishedwithout a legal basis (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege).42 Legal
methods are therefore also a theory of legal reasoning.43Specifically, the legal prac-
titionermust provewhy theywish to establish a development of the law contrary to
the wording and history of the law, or to the systematics or telos. Directive-compli-
ant development of the law means that the national judge no longer merely inter-
prets national law in the light of a EU directive, but oversteps the wording of the
national term, and thus develops new case groups within the boundaries of the
wording, or corrects the case-law.44 The highest German courts are now willing to
refer to directive-compliant development of the law as such.45 Even the ECJ has
39 K. Larenz,Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (6th ed, Berlin: Springer, 1991) 366; Möllers,
n 19 above, sec 4 para 36; R. Alexy and R. Dreier, ʻStatutory Interpretation in the Federal Republic
ofGermanyʼ, inN. MacCormickandR. Summers (eds), InterpretingStatutes (Aldershot:Dartmouth,
1991) 73, 78: ‘Decisionswhich remainwith the lexicalmeaning of a norm’swording are regarded as
interpretative, whereas those going beyond or against that meaning are classified as gap-filling.’
40 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (London: Awnsham Churchill, 1689) ch 7, s 93;
C. Montesquieu,De l’esprit des lois (Geneva, 1748) book 11, ch 6.
41 W. Flume, ʻRichter und Rechtʼ, in Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages (ed), Ver-
handlungen des 46. Deutschen Juristentages (vol II, Munich: C H Beck, 1967) K3–K35, at 18.
42 H. Schulze-Fielitz, in H. Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz (3rd ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2018) art 103 I
paras 20, 60–62.
43 For amodern legal methodological approachMöllers, n 19 above.
44 Möllers, n 19 above, sec 12 para 54–57.
45 The term is increasingly being used in Austria as well. Thus Austrian Supreme Court of Justice,
Judgment of 19 March 2013, 4 Ob 15/13d at [1.5.] – Sellout. Previously, Zöchling-Jud, n 32 above,
1757, 1763.
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refined its methodological terminology: it speaks of development of the law, and
includes legal concepts such as analogy46 or interpretation of the law contra le-
gem.47
3 The Boundaries of Directive-Compliant Development of the
Law in Accordance with the Case-Law of the ECJ and of the
Federal Constitutional Court
The distribution of competences between higher and lower levels plays a major
role in a multi-tier system. This applies for instance to the competitive relation-
ship between the Member States and the European Union. The ECJ encountered
important argumentative concepts of directive-compliant interpretation in nu-
merous decisions. Having said that, its stipulations are not always homogeneous.
In terms of the legislature’s intention, the ECJ presumes that the Member State
generally ‘intended to fully meet the obligations arising from the directive’.48 This
should apply ‘notwithstanding any contrary interpretation which may arise from
the travaux préparatoires for the national rule’.49 In terms of systematics, the ECJ
holds that the directive is the focus of analyses, meaning that the Member States
interpret the national law ‘in the light of the directive’ within their national mar-
gin of appreciation.50 The directive’s telos should be taken into account.51 ‘The
principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with Community
law requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction.’52 The
ECJ, however, considerably restricted these stipulations because Member States
46 For example, Krohn v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung (C-165/84) EU:
C:1985:507 at [14], [29]; cf alsoKoninklijke Coöperatie CosunUA vMinister van Landbouw,Natuur en
Voedselkwaliteit (C-248/04) EU:C:2006:666 at [40]; Union française de céréales v Hauptzollamt
Hamburg Jonas (C-6/78) EU:C:1978:154 at [4].
47 Cf n 12 above.
48 Wagner Miret v Fondo de garantía salarial (C-334/92) EU:C:1993:945 at [20]; similar wording in
Joined Cases Pfeiffer vDeutsches Rotes Kreuz (C-397 & C-403/01 et al) EU:C:2004:584 at [112].
49 Björnekulla Fruktindustrier AB v Procordia Food AB (C-371/02) EU:C:2004:275 at [13].
50 JoinedCases vonColson/KamannvLandNordrhein-Westfalen (C-14&C-79/83)EU:C:1984:153 at
[26]; Strafverfahren v Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV (C-80/86) EU:C:1987:431 at [12].
51 Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [110]–[111].
52 Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [111]; cf also Mono Car
Styling SA v Odemis and others (C‑12/08) EU:C:2009:466 at [61]; OSA v Léčebné lázně Mariánské
lázně (C-351/12) EU:C:2014:110 at [45].
The Principle of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law 475
must fully exhaust the margin of appreciation regarding national law.53 To this
end, the national court must decide whether it prefers to disregard the national
rule in question.54Moreover, the national judge’s obligation to consult the content
of the directive when interpreting the relevant provisions would be limited by the
general legal principles and in particular by the principle of legal certainty and
non-retroactivity, and may not be used as a basis for an interpretation of the na-
tional law contra legem.55
The ruling made by the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the
range of directive-compliant further development of the law is still somewhat im-
precise. In principle, it is undisputedly recognised that EU law affects national law
andmust be applied by German courts.56 However, there are only a few initial (not
yet homogeneous) chamber decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court on direc-
tive-compliant development of the law. The Court explicitly recognises directive-
compliant development of the law as an argumentative concept, and also accepts
the legal concept that the national legislature’s intention is, in case of doubt, not
directed at violating its obligation to implement the directive pursuant to Arti-
cle 288(3) TFEU.57 This results in an unintended regulatory gap, and thus in the
possibility to develop the law.58
53 JoinedCases vonColson/KamannvLandNordrhein-Westfalen (C-14&C-79/83)EU:C:1984:153 at
[28].
54 Dansk Industri vNachlass des Karsten Eigil Rasmussen (C-441/14) EU:C:2016:278 at [37].
55 Dansk Industri vNachlass des Karsten Eigil Rasmussen (C-441/14) EU:C:2016:278 at [33]–[34].
56 Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 18 October 1967, 1 BvR 248/63 et al, BVerfGE 22, 293 and
296 – EEC Regulations; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83,
BVerfGE 73, 339, 375 – As long as II.
57 Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 26 September 2011, 2 BvR 2216/06 et al, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 2012, 669 at [51] – s 5 of the Doorstep Selling Cancellation Act; Federal Constitutional
Court, Order of 17 January 2013, 1 BvR 121/11 et al, ZIP 2013, 924, 926 at [33]– sec 264 subsec 3 of the
Commercial Code.
58 Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 17 January 2013, 1 BvR 121/11 et al, ZIP 2013, 924, 926 at
[33] – sec 264 subsec 3 of the Commercial Code.
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III The traditional, narrow Concept of the Contra
Legem Boundary
1 Argumentation Concepts regarding the
Rejection of Directive-Compliant Development of
the Law
Many commentators consider the ECJ’s statements to be a purely optional aid,59
and opine that the decisive factor remains the national methodology.60 This is the
view that is taken in Austrian law.61 In addition, there is a popular opinion which
vehemently sets very narrow boundaries on the permissible directive-compliant
development of the law and presents numerous arguments: The value plan (Wer-
tungsplan) of national law is exclusively relevant.62 The judge only has the right
to develop the law in a directive-compliant manner if a margin of appreciation
results from national law.63 Consequently, directive-compliant development of
the law should not be permitted to override64 or ‘bend’65 the law. And finally,
judicial development of the law would be tantamount to an impermissible hori-
zontal effect.66 Since directive-compliant interpretation and its boundary are ar-
gumentation concepts of the national law, the judge must not fundamentally re-
59 For instance, thewording used byH. Hayden, ʻRichtlinienkonforme Interpretation undMetho-
denautonomie – Verlauf der Contra-legem-Grenze am Beispiel des Abgabenrechtsʼ (2016) 32 Zeit-
schrift für Europarecht, internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung 244, 249.
60 W.-H. Roth andC. Jopen, ‘Interpretation inConformitywithDirectives’, in K. Riesenhuber (ed),
European Legal Methodology (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017) sec 13 para 31.
61 Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 31 August 2010, 4 Ob 120/10s at [1.2.]: The na-
tional interpretation rules limit the interpretation in conformity with the directive; R. Rebhahn, in
A. Fenyves et al (eds), Großkommentar zum Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – Klang (3rd ed,
Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2014) after sec 6, 7 para 139.
62 C. Baldus and R. Becker, ʻHaustürgeschäfte und richtlinienkonforme Auslegung – Probleme
bei der Anwendung angeglichenen europäischen Privatrechtsʼ (1997) Zeitschrift für Europäisches
Privatrecht 874, 882.
63 C. Höpfner, ʻVoraussetzungen und Grenzen richtlinienkonformer Auslegung und Rechtsfort-
bildungʼ (2009) Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 73, 85.
64 Canaris, n 25 above, 94.
65 B. Heß, ʻZur Frage der unmittelbarenAnwendbarkeit von EG-Richtlinienʼ (1995) Juristenzeitung
150, 151.
66 M. Zöckler, ʻProbleme der richtlinienkonformen Auslegung des nationalen Zivilrechtsʼ (1992)
Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 141, 157 as well as the authors in n 25.
The Principle of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law 477
define the normative content of the national provision67 or lend it any other
meaning.68
2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the traditional Perspective
A number of arguments suggest such a traditional, narrow contra legem limit.
Maintaining the abovementioned argumentative canon thus appears methodolo-
gically consistent, given that Article 288(3) TFEU in fact permits the implementa-
tion of the directive in national law, and therefore the deduction of meaning
through legal methods is only possible at a national level.69 The judge would not
have to perform any methodological contortions. Above all, given his or her na-
tional perspective, the judge can reject the surprising ‘deviant interpretation re-
sult’70 of the ECJ, and does not have to worry about how to implement it in na-
tional law in terms of development of the law. The judge must as a matter of prin-
ciple accept the decisions of Parliament. He or she does not examine whether a
legal solution is the most appropriate, sensible or fair.71 The national court plays
the role of a servant in relation to Parliament, but in European Law it must serve
three masters at once.72 At European level, the Commission, the Council and Par-
liament issue a directive, which claims validity and thus applies at national level.
The national legislature then has to implement the EU directive. The national
judge is bound by the stipulations relating to implementation. And finally, the
ECJ – to which the national judge typically submits a question of interpretation
regarding the EU directive in a preliminary ruling procedure – clarifies EU law.
The national judges must then go on to decide how to resolve this multipolar
conflict – namely whether they can concur with the ECJ’s stipulations in confor-
mity with the directive, or whether they must refuse to do so and to transmit the
67 Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 8 September 2005, 8 ObS 13/05b, 5; Austrian
Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 19 December 2007, 9 ObA 106/06p, 10; Austrian Supreme
Court of Justice, Judgment of 7 February 2008, 9 ObA 161/07b, 3.
68 Rebhahn, n 61 above, after sec 6, 7 para 140; S. Perner,EU-Richtlinien undPrivatrecht (Vienna:
MANZ, 2012) 94; cf also the authors in n 99.
69 Baldus and Becker, n 62 above, 874, 882.
70 For instance the wording of Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 25 March 2014,
9 Ob 64/13x at [4.10].
71 Established case law, for instanceFederalConstitutional Court, Judgmentof 17 December 1953,
1 BvR 323/51 et al, BVerfGE 3, 162, 182; Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 26 March 1980, 1 BvR
121/76 et al, BVerfGE 54, 11, 26.
72 The judge as a servant of the legislature, P. Heck, ʻGesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurispru-
denzʼ (1914) 112Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 1, 19–23.
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implementation order to the national legislature. This is not a question of the
judge modelling the law at the expense of the legislature, but of the national
judge trying to optimally serve all three masters.
IV The New, Modern Approach of Case-Law
regarding the Boundary of Permissible
Directive-Compliant Development of the Law
How can judgments of the German Federal Labour Court,73 the Federal Court of
Justice74 and the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice75 be justified when they over-
rule the wording of a provision of the Civil Code and explain this with a teleologi-
cal reduction of the provision so that they do not have to apply it? Contrary to the
traditionally narrow perspective presented above, it will be shown below that nu-
merous legal figures of argumentation favour a broad, modern boundary of the
directive-compliant development of the law. Interest-based, historical, teleologi-
cal and systematic arguments support this.
1 Interest-based Considerations of Directive-Compliant
Development of the Law
A directive-compliant interpretation corresponds first and foremost to the inten-
tion of the national Parliament. If the national Parliament errs, then the case-law
can remedy the error by means of directive-compliant development of the law. If
the directive-compliant development of the law is affirmed in a broad sense, this
allows the Member State to make mistakes in the process of implementing the
law. In other words, the national Parliament now utilises its margin of apprecia-
tion to implement the directive in such a way that as little as possible of the pre-
73 For example,Federal LabourCourt, Judgmentof 24 March2009, 9AZR983/07,BAGE130, 119 at
[64] –Holiday pay.
74 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 26 November 2008, VIII ZR 200/05, BGHZ 179, 27 at [21]–
[35] –Quelle; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 21 December 2011, VIII ZR 70/08, BGHZ 192, 148
at [30]–[47] – Tiles; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 7 May 2014, IV ZR 76/11, BGHZ 201, 101 at
[22]–[23] – Revocation of life insurance.
75 Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 15 February 2011, 4 Ob 208/10g at [3] – Zuga-
benverbot.
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vious national doctrine must be abandoned.76 This is best demonstrated by the
cases relating to the Consumer Sales Directive.77 If the national judge were to be
deprived of the directive-compliant development of the law as a legal instrument,
thus putting the national Parliament at risk of incurring state liability, in the fu-
ture Parliament would be best advised to refrain from implementing that law in
national codifications, and then simply declare the directive to be binding na-
tional law on expiry of the implementation period. This would render obsolete the
notion that directives impinge on national law to a lesser extent than regulations
do, and in accordance with Article 288(3) TFEU leaves ʻto the national authorities
the choice of forms and methods’. Moreover, the court only temporarily impinges
on the legislature’s competences, given that the principle of transparency devel-
oped by the ECJ requires that an unambiguous regulation be incorporated into
national law in the medium term.78 In all three cases mentioned above, the Ger-
man legislature created a legal regulation for the implementation of the ECJ’s sti-
pulations.79 The legislature is free to correct the court’s solution at any time.80 This
is separation of powers par excellence.
2 The national Legislature’s Intention
Moreover, it can be argued that the German legislature did not intend to violate its
obligation of implementation in accordance with Article 288(3) TFEU.81 If courts
base their further development of the law on the presumption of an across-the-
76 On this alreadyMöllers (2003), n 27 above, 72.
77 Cf n 26 above.
78 Comission vKingdomof theNetherlands (C-144/99) EU:C:2001:257 at [21]–principle of transpar-
ency in the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts; on this H.-W. Micklitz, ʻKommentar zu
EuGH vom 10.05.2001 – (Rs C-144/99)ʼ (2001) EuropäischesWirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 486, 487.
79 Following the ECJ’sDraehmpaehl Judgment, the German legislature introduced a claim regard-
less of fault for damages in sec 611 a of the German Civil Code, old version, Federal Law Gazette
(BGBl) 2002 I, 42, 156. The legislature took theFederal Court of Justice’sQuelle rulingas anoccasion
to rule out claimsof the seller for use in the event of the sale of consumer goods, sec 474 subsec 5 of
the German Civil Code, BT-Drucks 16/10607, 5–6. The Tiles ruling is implemented in sec 439 sub-
sec 3 of the German Civil Code, BGBl 2017 I, 969–970.
80 The legislature has thus rescinded the former contrary case-law of the Federal Court of Justice.
Put in explicit terms for instance in BT-Drucks 18/8486, 27. On the previous law, Federal Court of
Justice, Judgment of 17 October 2012, VIII ZR 226/11, BGHZ 195, 135 at [17]–[28].
81 Federal Constitutional Court, Chamber’s Order of 26 September 2011, 2 BvR 2216/06 et al,
BVerfGE 19, 89, 101 – s 5 of the Doorstep Selling Cancellation Act: ‘[...] given that it is a law imple-
menting aUnion-wide legal act such as a directive, itmaybe taken into account at national level by
assuming that, in caseof doubt, the legislature of theMemberState inquestiondidnotwish toact in
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board willingness to implement, this does not contradict the separation of
powers, given that courts must comply with the will of the legislature. Even if it
is often not possible to explicitly identify such an across-the-board willingness to
implement, it will be possible to presume its existence.82 Otherwise, it would risk
becoming liable for damages. In the Quelle case, the Federal Court of Justice con-
sidered the legislature’s subjective intention to correctly implement the directive
to be material, and consequently affirmed an unintended regulatory gap consti-
tuting an entitlement to develope the law by teleological reduction of section 439
subsection 4 of the Civil Code.83 Since the development of the law changes the
existing law to a greater extent than interpretation does, the directive-compliant
development of the law should be supported by further legal arguments regarding
the telos of the directive and an intention to maintain the consistency of the sys-
tem.
3 The Alignment of National Argumentative Concepts with the
Telos of the Directive
Finally, the telos of the directive must be considered in order to determine the
boundaries of the directive-compliant development of the law. However, the rea-
soning in the legal literature is inadequate in some respects. One view interprets
the German legal provision in the light of the directive, meaning that it considers
the German provision in the context of the overall legal systemwhich is composed
of national law and of the directive.84 This has been criticised, holding that the
directive is an independent regulatory system that is however not directly applic-
able to everyone in Germany. Following these systematic reflections would de-
grade the domestic legal provisions so that they would merely become a dynamic
violation of its obligation under Article 288 sentence 3 TFEU to implement the objective of the di-
rective within the time limit.’
82 T. M. J. Möllers andA. Möhring, ʻRecht und Pflicht zur richtlinienkonformen Rechtsfortbildung
bei generellen Umsetzungswillen des Gesetzgebersʼ (2008) Juristenzeitung 919, 922; H. Schulte-
Noelke and C. Busch, ʻMittelbare horizontale Direktwirkung von umgesetzten EG-Richtlinienʼ, in
A. Hendrich et al (eds), Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich:
C H Beck, 2007) 800–803; Roth and Jopen, n 60 above, sec 13 para 39.
83 Cf n 29. Similar for Austria: Austrian Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment of 15 February 2011,
4 Ob 208/10g at [2.3.(a)] – Zugabenverbot.
84 M. Auer, ʻNeues zu Umfang und Grenzen der richtlinienkonformen Auslegungʼ (2007) Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1106, 1108; O. Mörsdorf, ʻVerpflichtung des Käufers zur Zahlung eines
Nutzungsentgelts im Rahmen der Neulieferung einer mangelhaften Kaufsacheʼ (2008) Zeitschrift
fürWirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1409, 1415.
The Principle of Directive-Compliant Development of the Law 481
reference to the directive in its respective version as currently propagated by the
ECJ.85 Moreover, such an interpretation would contradict the principles of the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations, especially the requirements for clarity and fin-
ality of legal provisions.86 A second view finds the primacy of the directive suffi-
cient to consider it as an ‘objective-teleological’ criterion.87 This view is rightly
criticised, given that an obligation cannot result from primacy as such.88
A different justification is consequently required in order to establish the re-
levance of the directive when interpreting national law. The ECJ has developed a
two-tier concept, distinguishing between direct applicability and primacy of ap-
plication. A European provision applies directly in each Member State without the
concrete consent of the Member State.89 The ECJ explains this direct applicability
of EU law in the Member States with the fact that the legislative powers have been
conferred on the EU from the Member States by virtue of their signing the EEC
Treaty.90 This applicability refers to all sources of EU law, including EU directives.
European provisions apply directly in the Member States.91 It is recognised that
the advance effect of a directive already engages when the directive comes into
force without the implementation period having yet expired. This shows that the
direct applicability of a directive triggers the obligation to interpret national law
in a directive-compliant manner.92 In doctrinal terms, national law and the direc-
tive constitute a comprehensive legal system.93 Even if the directive itself does not
85 M. Herdegen, ʻRichtlininenkonforme Auslegung im Bankrecht: Schranken nach Europa- und
Verfassungsrechtʼ (2005) Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (WM) 1921, 1928–1929;
G. Schulze, ʻNo compensation for use in the case of a supplementary delivery: Comment on ECJ
Judgment of 17 April 2008, C-404/06 – Quelleʼ (2008) Zeitschrift für das Privatrecht der Euro-
päischen Union (GPR) 128, 131.
86 Herdegen, n 85 above, 1929; J. Schürnbrand, ʻDie Grenzen richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfortbil-
dung im Privatrechtʼ (2007) Juristenzeitung 910, 916; M. Franzen, ʻHeininger und die Folgen – ein
Lehrstück Gemeinschaftsprivatrechtʼ (2003) Juristenzeitung 321, 327.
87 Canaris, n 25 above, 87–89.
88 Perner, n 68 above, 108–109.
89 M. Nettesheim, in E. Grabitz et al (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union (60th ed, Munich:
C H Beck, October 2016) art 288 TFEU para 41; W. Frenz, Europarecht (2nd ed, Berlin: Springer,
2016) para 9.
90 Costa v E.N.E.L. (6/64) EU:C:1964:66, 1253, 1270; W. Schroeder, in R. Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV
(3rd ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2018) art 288 TFEU para 36.
91 Italian Finance Administration v Simmenthal II (C-106/77) EU:C:1978:49 at [17]–[24].
92 Inter-Environnement Wallonie v Région wallonne (C-129/96) EU:C:1997:628 at [48]; Adeneler v
Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [121]; on this Schroeder, n 90 above,
paras 68–67.
93 Roth and Jopen, n 60 above, sec 13 para 32; C. Herresthal, Rechtsfortbildung im europarechtli-
chen Bezugsrahmen (Munich: C H Beck, 2006) 224.
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exert any horizontal effect between citizens, it can assert its applicability given
that, in accordance with Article 288(3) TFEU, it is binding on every Member State.
The obligation to interpret national law teleologically in the light of the directive
follows only from this. The content of the directive thus does not create explicit
supremacy like primary European law. The content of the directive is, however,
also not national law, as is claimed at times.94 The content of the directive must,
however, be taken into account when interpreting national law. Twenty years
ago, the obligation incumbent on Member States that the directive’s value judg-
ment must be reflected in national law – even if only imperfectly – was estab-
lished in doctrinal terms.95 The image of the Hin- und Herwandern des Blickes
(wandering back and forth between the facts and the provision) can be used for
this purpose.96 The directive-compliant development of the law does not cling to
the hitherto national systematics, nor does it force the result of the directive’s
interpretation. In doctrinal terms, the accord between the directive and the na-
tional provision must be taken into account as the objective of interpretation, and
this applies already when identifying the content of the national provision.
The teleological interpretation is two-tiered because the first step consists of
defending the asserted purpose, and the second lies in developing its conse-
quences for the interpretation of the law.97 Thus the search for the telos is only a
premise which must be substantiated by further argumentative concepts.98 Yet, if
the directive is part of the overall legal order – and directive-compliant interpreta-
tion requires one to roam between national law and the directive – then the deci-
sive regulatory objective is no longer the national provision, but in fact the direc-
tive. Questions concerning an unintended regulatory gap, the margin of apprecia-
tion or the normative purpose must therefore include the directive in the
argumentation. This results in a new interpretation of the provision, but the result
94 Cf n 84 above.
95 For instance, Möllers (2003), n 27 above, 72; concurring Roth and Jopen, n 60 above, sec 13
para 39.
96 K. Engisch, Logische Studien zur Gesetzesanwendung (3rd ed, Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1963) 15;
T. Pfeiffer, ʻRichtlinienkonforme Auslegung gegen den Wortlaut des nationalen Gesetzes – Die
Quelle FolgeentscheidungdesBGHʼ (2009)Neue JuristischeWochenschrift 412, 413: ʻRoamingof the
gaze between national law and the relevant directive lawʼ (Pendelblick zwischen nationalem Recht
und demmaßgebenden Richtlinienrecht).
97 M. Morlok, ʻDie vier Auslegungsmethoden –was sonst?ʼ, in G. Gabriel and R. Gröschner (eds),
Subsumtion (Heidelberg: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) 204. A conclusion is the further development of the
law by analogy or teleological reduction to achieve the purpose of the norm.
98 F. Müller and R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik (vol II, 3rd ed, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
2013) para 103; S. A. E. Martens, Methodenlehre des Unionsrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2013) 457, 461.
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of the ECJ’s interpretation of the applicable directive is being taken into account.
Following the above deliberations that national law and the directive constitute
an overall legal order does not mean that the provisions of EU law must automa-
tically be disregarded due to a lack of direct horizontal third-party effect. In fact,
the contra legem limit continues to apply, albeit with limited scope. In conse-
quence, however, the widespread proposition that the directive-compliant inter-
pretation depends on the value-plan of national law is incorrect.99 Fortunately,
some of the highest courts are now – albeit still tentatively and with caution –
adopting the perspective which the author had already presented twenty years
ago.100 For example, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht,
BVerwG) and the Federal Court of Justice write: ‘The directive thus serves both as
the benchmark for identifying regulatory gaps and for remedying them’.101 And
finally: ‘If the legislature strives for directive-compliant implementation, this pur-
pose – albeit possibly imperfectly realised –must be prioritised over the objective
pursued by the individual provision’.102
4 Dogmatic Consistency of the System
The principle of directive-compliant development of the law is doctrinally103 con-
sistent. The Member States voted to adopt the directive in the Council and the
European Parliament; there is no doubt that there is sufficient democratic legiti-
macy. Accepting this circumstance and the image of the three masters, it appears
to be consistent to align legal doctrine and national methodology to the limits of
development of the law in order to resolve the conflict. In constitutional law,
higher-ranking law can force a development of the law contra legem as well, so
that the constitutional development of the law is pertinent.104 In terms of metho-
99 Cf n 62 above.
100 Cf n 27 above.
101 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 7 May 2014, IV ZR 76/11, BGHZ 201, 101 at [23] – Revoca-
tion of life insurance [translated from the original German]; concurring Federal Administrative
Court, Judgment of 31 January 2017, 6 C 2.16, BVerwGE 157, 249 at [26] – Price adjustment, Telecom-
munications Act.
102 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 7 May 2014, IV ZR 76/11, BGHZ 201, 101 at [26] – Revoca-
tion of life insurance [translated from the original German].
103 Doctrine gives law a structure and inner coherence by postulating adherence to principles, cf
Möllers, n 19 above, sec 9 para 2–8a.
104 The Federal Court of Justice developed a claim for such damages due to a violation of person-
ality rights in contradiction to the wording and intention of the legislature. Cf Federal Constitu-
tional Court, Order of 14 February 1973, 1 BvR 112/65, BVerfGE 34, 269 and 288 – Soraya.
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dology, directive-compliant interpretation is less than the primacy of application
and interpretation in compliance with primary law because it entails that EU law
must be applied directly. The national judge must reinterpret the law of the
Member State subject to the stipulations of the ECJ. This is development of
the law. This view does not equate the effect of a directive to a horizontal third-
party effect105 because the contra legem limit and national dogmatics continue to
apply.
V Finally: the Contra Legem Limit
1 The Shift of the Contra Legem Limit
Development of the law often does not fit into the doctrine of national law; the
national legislature hopes to preserve certain legal institutions. Development of
the law now forces a U-turn, which is a typical element of development of the law.
This phenomenon is not entirely unknown in the constitutional development of
the law. According to the view expressed here, historical, systematic and teleolo-
gical arguments must be combined in national and European contexts under di-
rective-compliant development of the law. The three abovementioned rulings re-
lating to German law can be harmonised with German law. The cases may not,
however, only be interpreted in the context of previous German law, but directive-
compliant further development of the law requires German law to be interpreted
in the context of EU directives. The wording, history, systematics and telos of Ger-
man law are not decisive because it is the telos of the directive that is at stake. In
the Harz case, the Federal Labour Court relied on the claim to damages for pain
and suffering due to a violation of personality rights, since this claim has been
recognised by the case-law for decades.106 The personality right is a framework
right. A contravention of legal interests is consequently contingent on balancing
legal assets and interests, and this must be carried out on a case-by-case basis.107
However, a comparison with the offences of defamation – such as negative state-
ments regarding race, religion or party affiliation – of necessity lead to the unlaw-
105 But for instance, Franzen, n 86 above, 327; Schürnbrand, n 86 above, 913; B. Gsell, ʻZur Frage
des Nutzungsersatzes bei Lieferung einer mangelhaften Kaufsache beim Verbrauchsgüterkaufʼ
(2009) Juristenzeitung 522, 524.
106 Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 14 February 1973, 1 BvR 112/65, BVerfGE 34, 269 at
[281]–[284] – Soraya.
107 W. Fikentscher and A. Heinemann, Schuldrecht, (11th ed, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017) paras 1571,
1584–1590.
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fulness of the discrimination.108 Affirming a claim for damages therefore complies
with the German system. As a result, the development of the law by the Federal
Labour Court was permissible.109 In the Quelle case, besides the legislature’s in-
tention, arguments can be made with the telos of the directive, but also with the
telos of the Civil Code. As a result of the implementation of the Consumer Sales
Directive in the Civil Code, the perspective is different than in the previous law.
The question therefore arises as to whether the current system of the Civil Code,
which includes the change of perspective, allows the remedying of an unintended
regulatory gap by development of the law in conformity with the doctrine. The
decisive point in the Quelle case was that the claims for defects could be asserted
‘free of charge’ in accordance with the wording and regulatory purpose of the
directive, as otherwise the consumer would be deterred from asserting these
rights. Such a regulatory purpose is definitely compatible with the German law of
obligations. The ECJ has already provided the decisive argument here: as the
buyer had never acquired the goods in a non-defective state, the right to compen-
sation for use was ruled out because the buyer had not been enriched.110 But if the
values espoused by the Consumer Sales Directive, namely to achieve a remedy
free of charge, are taken into account in the Tiles case, this goal would be counter-
acted by an objection of disproportionality.111
2 The Contra Legem Limit as the Boundary of Development of
the Law
The ECJ stressed that the contra legem boundary can limit directive-compliant
interpretation.112 It has not yet been fully clarified what the contra legem limit
actually means in the European perspective that is represented here. Three cases
will be mentioned here. Firstly, if the national legislature deliberately disregards
108 C. W. Beyer and T. M. J. Möllers, ʻDie Europäisierung des Arbeitsrechtsʼ (1991) Juristenzeitung
24, 28; different view K. Larenz and C.-W. Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, Besonderer Teil (vo-
l II/2, 13th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 1994) 502.
109 Beyer andMöllers, n 108 above, 28–30, Möllers (2003), n 27 above, 80.
110 Quelle AG v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände (C-404/06)
EU:C:2008:231 at [40]–[41].
111 For instance the stipulations of the Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 2 April 1974, 1 BvR
92/97 et al, BVerfGE 37, 67 and 81; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 21 December 2011, VIII ZR
70/08, BGHZ 192, 148 at [37]–[47] – Tiles.
112 Cf the quotation at n 12 above, Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04)
EU:C:2006:443 at [110]–[111]. Woods, Watson and Costa, n 2 above, 139–143: ʻcontra legem princi-
ple’.
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EU law, directive-compliant development of the law is not possible. The same
applies if the legislature did not wish to regulate the case constellation. The 8th
Senate of the Federal Court of Justice, which handed down the Quelle and Tiles
rulings, has recently rejected directive-compliant development of the law. The ECJ
had found that the right of German gas suppliers to change prices violated the
directive’s transparency requirements.113 The 8th Senate considered rejecting de-
velopment of the law because the legislature did not wish to regulate the rules
on transparency itself, but instead to leave the regulation up to the EU legisla-
ture.114
Secondly, directive-compliant development of the law is moreover impossible
if the intention to implement EU law is not reflected in national law as a value
decision, and if directive-compliant development of the law would lead to a sig-
nificant infraction of the system in national law. This is referred to as a closed sys-
tem, and development of the law would modify the basic concept of the legisla-
ture. Examples include the distinction between fault-based liability and strict lia-
bility in German private law.115 After the Federal Labour Court had recognised a
claim for damages for pain and suffering due to a violation of personality rights in
accordance with section 823 subsection 1 of the Civil Code in the Harz case,116 the
question arose as to whether the fault characteristic in section 823 subsection 1 of
the Civil Code could be waived. The Federal Labour Court explicitly rejected this
in the Kalanke case.117 This was appropriate, and would have resulted in an im-
permissible development of the law contra legem because the Civil Code makes no
provision for general strict liability.118
113 JoinedCases Schulz vTechnischeWerke Schussental (C-359&C-400/11) EU:C:2014:2317 at [53].
114 Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 28 October 2015, VIII ZR 158/11, Neue Juristische Wo-
chenschrift 2016, 1718, 1722 at [44] – Price adjustment clause; concurring Federal Constitutional
Court, Chamber’s Order of 17 November 2017, 2 BvR 1131/16, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-
RechtsprechungsReport 2018, 305 at [38] – Price adjustment, Telecommunications Act.
115 Möllers, n 19 above, sec 13 para 29–32.
116 Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 14 March 1989, 8 AZR 447/87, BAGE 61, 209 and 215–216 –
Harz.
117 Federal Labour Court, Judgment of 5 March 1996, 1 AZR 590/92, BAGE 82, 211, 230 – Kalanke
(Bremenwomen’s quota): ‘An interpretationof ss 823and847of theGermanCivil Code [now: ss 823
and 253 subsec 1 of the German Civil Code] in conformity with Community law in accordance with
which fault should bewaived in cases of discrimination is not possible.’
118 SupremeCourt of theGermanEmpire, Judgment of 11 January 1912, VI 86/11, RGZ78, 171, 172–
Luftschiffer; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 29 April 1960, VI ZR 113/59,Neue JuristischeWo-
chenschrift 1960, 1345 and 1346 – Drag lift: negating an analogy to the Liability Act (Haftpflichtge-
setz, HaftPflG); G. Wagner, in F. J. Säcker et al (eds),Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Ge-
setzbuch (7th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2017) before sec 823 paras 25–26.
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Thirdly, in the Kolpinghuis Nijmegen case, the ECJ found that the general prin-
ciples must be considered – meaning that criminal sanctions cannot be based on
a directive that has yet to be implemented.119 In the Adeneler case, the ECJ ad-
dressed the prohibition of retroactive effect and the protection of legitimate expec-
tations as a limit on the development of the law.120
V Summary
1. Under German and Austrian Law there is a strict distinction: interpretation re-
mains within the wording of a statute, development of the law exceeds the limits
of the wording. The linguistic distinction of interpretation and development of the
law reflects the different justification effort. However, the ECJ does not recognise
this distinction and generally uses the term ‘interpretation’ in a wide sense, cover-
ing both interpretation and further development of the law that goes beyond the
wording.
2. In the past, the traditional view in Germany restricted the development of
the law in conformity with the directive to the limits of the wording. However, this
disregards the principle that courts have to do whatever lies within their national
judicial power to interpret the law in a directive-compliant manner. Therefore,
German courts have continuously corrected their previous case law based on the
stipulations of the ECJ. This modern approach has developed the law contrary to
the wording and justified this with an obligation to develop the national law in
conformity with the directive.
3. Development of the law in conformity with the directive would be legally
inadmissible if the legislator intentionally disregards the directive’s stipulations,
the result fundamentally contradicts the previous system of the national law, or
legitimate expectations are substantially violated.
119 Criminal Proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV (C-80/86) EU:C:1987:431 at [13].
120 Cf n 12,Adeneler v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (C-212/04) EU:C:2006:443 at [110]–[111]. In a
ruling on Irish law the ECJ accepted hat no retrospective applicationwas possible at the expense of
the citizen. Cf Impact v Minister for Agriculture and Food and others (C-268/06) EU:C:2008:223 at
[102]–[103].
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